The story of the Force 10 gale which decimated the 1979 Fastnet race is dramatic and tragic but the ramifications for sailing continued to unfold for decades. A massive search and rescue operation was begun on 13 August 1979 as half of the 300 yachts competing went missing in a 20,000 square-mile area of the Irish Sea. The BBC re-enactment below is worth a watch.

 


 

In the aftermath of the race and the analysis published by John Rousmaniere in his book Fastnet Force 10, many leading designers and sailors began to question the direction of design trends.

The Force 10 gale (48 to 55 knots) and very large, confused seas hit the fleet of 303 boats that was racing from the southern England, around Fastnet Rock off the southern tip of Ireland. From surveys taken by race organizers and from interviews performed by Rousmaniere in preparation for writing his book, some very disturbing statistics came to light.

It’s estimated that at least 18 boats were rolled a full 360 degrees. Twenty-four boats were abandoned, five sank, and approximately 170 were rolled over until their masts hit the water. Also, it was reported that five boats became inverted — turned turtle — and remained upside down for periods between 30 seconds and five minutes. Lastly, and tragically, 15 sailors lost their lives to drowning or hypothermia.

Fastnet disaster 1979: learning the lessons

Fastnet disaster 1979: learning the lessons.



 

Official enquiries


One of the earliest inquiries into the 1979 Fastnet race was published jointly by the RYA and the Royal Ocean Racing Club. The recommendations were broken down into four categories, the first of which was “The design and construction of competing yachts and of their equipment.” The recommendations highlighted the weakness of much of the steering gear aboard many of the most severely affected boats and the importance of emergency steering systems. The importance of companionways that can be opened and secured closed from above and below was also emphasised, as was the proper stowage of items down below (in the case of a 180° inversion) and the importance of pumping any water in the cabin overboard rather than into the cockpit (with the exception of open cockpit designs).

Training in sea survival as well as improvements in radio communication and weather reporting have also been influenced by the 1979 Fastnet tragedy. Also, RORC and other offshore racing organisers are now much more willing to postpone the start of even the largest events when severe weather is forecast.

 

Cruising Club of America


In the spring of 1980, the Cruising Club of America (CCA), which was preparing to run its biennial Newport-Bermuda Race took a long hard look at the Fastnet race and began to study what could be done to prevent such a disaster from reoccurring.

Five years later, a final report was issued and offers several broad conclusions that help illuminate what is safe and what is not in hull and yacht design.

The conclusions of the report, in brief, are:

- Larger boats are less prone to capsize than smaller boats.

- A dismasted sailboat is more likely to capsize than a boat carrying her full rig.

- A boat has an inherent stability range, ie., an angle of heel past which it will capsize. That stability range can be calculated from the boat’s lines and specifications.

- Some boats designed to the IOR rule, or any designed to be particularly beamy, may remain inverted following a capsize. Boats with a stability range under 120 degrees may remain inverted for as long as two minutes.

- Boats lying sideways to a sea, particularly light, beamy vessels, are more likely to capsize than boats that are held bow to the sea or stern to the sea. It follows, then, that boats that are sailed actively in gale conditions and breaking seas are more likely to avoid capsize than those left to lie untended, beam to the seas.

- The issue of whether or not a boat will capsize, and when and how it might suffer such a fate, is a key point for any sailor contemplating safe extended coastal or offshore cruising. By analysing a boat’s stability range, you can get a very good reading on how the boat will handle a gale at sea and how best to plan your own gale tactics.

The CCA committee that compiled the five-year Fastnet report came up with a simple formula to determine the stability of any yacht of a fairly standard type and of a size suitable for offshore sailing. The formula is as follows:

Capsize Screening # = Boat’s Max. Beam (feet) / Cube Root (Gross Displacement / 64)

In English: take the boat’s gross displacement in pounds, divide it by 64 and then take the cube root of the quotient. Now, divide the boat’s maximum beam in feet by the cube root figure. The resulting number should be 2 or less. In general, if the number is over 2, the boat fails the screen. If the number is under 2, the boat passes. Again, the formula is a very general guide, and does not take into account a number of other important design factors that might lessen — or increase — a boat’s tendency to capsize. Use the formula to get a quick idea of a boat’s stability, but also explore the boat’s full capsize characteristics before you decide to purchase it and set off sailing in open waters.

In the EU, the Recreational Craft Directive (RCD) was introduced to ensure manufacturers comply with basic stability requirements when advertising boats as being suitable for offshore sailing conditions.